Spain-Politics 2
My dinner break turned out to be a few days long, but I'd like to follow up on my line of thought from Monday. Upon rereading, I realized that some people reading this might find my couple of paragraphs cold and unemotional. I am writing, after all, about the deaths of nearly 200 human beings.
The reason for my austerity is that I think any attempt by me to give weight to these people's deaths by describing the attacks as 'brutal,' 'murderous,' or other suchlike would result not in an honoring of their deaths, but rather would result in the opposite because such words are insufficient. A person who murders a human being is murderous. It seems an abuse of language to apply the same to someone who ends the lives of 200, 3000, or 5 million. If we keep in mind that there is a human being behind each one of those numbers then that number can better express than any trite adjective the loss of these people.
Where I left off Monday was with the question of whether in fact the Madrid attacks had been successful. 1) On the level of the actual carrying out of the attack: obviously 'yes' or I wouldn't be writing about it. 2) On the political level by influencing the elections: I think 'yes' again. It's my interpretation that it was less the handling of the attacks by the government that accounted for the change in opinions as much as the desire to disengage from the fight against Islamic terrorism.
The ruling PP had been very tough on the Basque nationalist terror group, ETA, and had built part of their political support on this basis. They had also taken a very tough public stance against al-Qaeda and supported the Iraq War which was waged partly in the name of fighting terrorism (I will be writing more on this fact later). Almost every commentator I read between the time of the attacks and the elections three days later had something along these lines to say about the implications of the identity of the responsible group:
::::: Many political analysts say that if ETA was responsible for the attack, it would favour the Popular Party in the election because of its hard line against the group.
"If, however, the rumours about Al Qaeda gain credence, then things would be perceived in a very different way," pollster Julian Santamaria said. ::::: full article here
But why would it make a difference if the PP had been tough on both ETA and al-Qaeda? The key difference is that the threat from ETA is domestic and there is no choice but to deal with the problem. ETA is not going away. However, the implication of the election results seems to be that al-Qaeda is not so recognized. It is rather seen as something that can be dealt with by not being so cosy with the country toward which the sharpest hate of al-Qaeda is directed, namely, the US. If we aren't such good friends with al-Qaeda's primary enemy then we'll no longer be al-Qaeda's enemy. That is what I meant in saying that I think Spain tried to disengage from the fight against terrorism. I have no doubt that they will continue to fight it on their own soil, but I have serious doubts about whether they will be willing to help in legitimate overseas anti-terror operations (what exactly constitutes a 'legitimate overseas anti-terror operation' is something that also deserves attention). Such operations would make Spain a more likely target of terrorism in the voters minds and be therefore unsupportable.
What I've written does not concern the way one conducts the fight against terrorism. I don't know what the best strategy is. We have to find the best strategy and that requires debate, but the question of whether to fight terrorism is not a question at all. I may disagree with the way the Bush administration has conducted their war on terrorism and I do, profoundly. But I'm proud to see that across the political spectrum, the rational portion of it at least, there is 100% consensus that we are determined to fight terrorism. I'll likely be writing more about the how well the publicly expressed determination has matched with deeds by politicians.
The reason for my austerity is that I think any attempt by me to give weight to these people's deaths by describing the attacks as 'brutal,' 'murderous,' or other suchlike would result not in an honoring of their deaths, but rather would result in the opposite because such words are insufficient. A person who murders a human being is murderous. It seems an abuse of language to apply the same to someone who ends the lives of 200, 3000, or 5 million. If we keep in mind that there is a human being behind each one of those numbers then that number can better express than any trite adjective the loss of these people.
Where I left off Monday was with the question of whether in fact the Madrid attacks had been successful. 1) On the level of the actual carrying out of the attack: obviously 'yes' or I wouldn't be writing about it. 2) On the political level by influencing the elections: I think 'yes' again. It's my interpretation that it was less the handling of the attacks by the government that accounted for the change in opinions as much as the desire to disengage from the fight against Islamic terrorism.
The ruling PP had been very tough on the Basque nationalist terror group, ETA, and had built part of their political support on this basis. They had also taken a very tough public stance against al-Qaeda and supported the Iraq War which was waged partly in the name of fighting terrorism (I will be writing more on this fact later). Almost every commentator I read between the time of the attacks and the elections three days later had something along these lines to say about the implications of the identity of the responsible group:
::::: Many political analysts say that if ETA was responsible for the attack, it would favour the Popular Party in the election because of its hard line against the group.
"If, however, the rumours about Al Qaeda gain credence, then things would be perceived in a very different way," pollster Julian Santamaria said. ::::: full article here
But why would it make a difference if the PP had been tough on both ETA and al-Qaeda? The key difference is that the threat from ETA is domestic and there is no choice but to deal with the problem. ETA is not going away. However, the implication of the election results seems to be that al-Qaeda is not so recognized. It is rather seen as something that can be dealt with by not being so cosy with the country toward which the sharpest hate of al-Qaeda is directed, namely, the US. If we aren't such good friends with al-Qaeda's primary enemy then we'll no longer be al-Qaeda's enemy. That is what I meant in saying that I think Spain tried to disengage from the fight against terrorism. I have no doubt that they will continue to fight it on their own soil, but I have serious doubts about whether they will be willing to help in legitimate overseas anti-terror operations (what exactly constitutes a 'legitimate overseas anti-terror operation' is something that also deserves attention). Such operations would make Spain a more likely target of terrorism in the voters minds and be therefore unsupportable.
What I've written does not concern the way one conducts the fight against terrorism. I don't know what the best strategy is. We have to find the best strategy and that requires debate, but the question of whether to fight terrorism is not a question at all. I may disagree with the way the Bush administration has conducted their war on terrorism and I do, profoundly. But I'm proud to see that across the political spectrum, the rational portion of it at least, there is 100% consensus that we are determined to fight terrorism. I'll likely be writing more about the how well the publicly expressed determination has matched with deeds by politicians.
posted by joe at
4:28 PM
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